






PUBLIC BANKS MATTER 
AT A TIME OF COVID-19
Covid-19 has had a devastating impact on lives and liveli-hoods around the world. Lockdowns and public health measures have decimated the economies of most coun-
tries, leading to dramatic state interventions to stem the fallout. 
Governments have been on the frontline of this economic de-
fence, as have public banks. Nobody expected the private sector 
to take the lead. Corporate shareholders took no proactive stance 
towards bailing out struggling businesses, households or govern-
ments. Rather, governments and public banks have charted the 
path to recovery. There are good reasons for this, and the future of 
stable, sustainable and equitable societies will depend on building 
on the lessons now being learned.
This book focuses on the role that public banks have played 
in managing the economic crises of Covid-19 to date. Researched 
and written between May and October of 2020, it is a ‘rapid re-
sponse’ effort to document and critically reflect upon public bank 
actions and policies in the initial stages of Covid-19 in different 
parts of the world. Working with researchers on every continent, 
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the book is the most ambitious effort to date to explore and docu-
ment the ways in which public banks have responded to Covid-19. 
It sheds light on public bank policies and actions and assesses the 
challenges they face. We make a preliminary assessment of their 
effectiveness in achieving their goals and stemming the economic 
impacts of the pandemic. 
This has been no easy task, as the ground was constantly shift-
ing: programmes announced were not always put in place directly; 
some seemingly “new” programmes were really just being fast-for-
warded; bold new policies were surpassed just weeks later by even 
bolder ones, and so on. Nevertheless, the chapters provide a useful 
snapshot of a tumultuous time. Based on desktop analysis of bank 
media statements and reports, financial databases and government 
news releases, as well as interviews with leading bank personnel 
(carried out virtually), the book provides a unique perspective of 
what some are calling the most damaging global crisis in more than 
a century. The lessons learned from these contributions should 
contribute to a better understanding – both theoretical and empir-
ical – of how public banks can be better supported for the future 
and how they can help to ensure that this pandemic does not lead to 
another “lost decade” (UNCTAD 2020).
Two other contextual factors are important to help gain an un-
derstanding of the contributions of these chapters. The first is that 
Covid-19 did not strike upon a world economy that was otherwise 
stable and in good shape. On the contrary, many have long been 
worried that the last few decades of excessive de-regulation, hy-
per-financialization, privatization and globalization had left the 
world economy in an unbalanced, inequitable and precarious state. 
Covid-19 served to pull back the curtains and shine a light on this 
fragility, but it did not create it. Second, the coronavirus is widely 
believed to be related to global warming and climate change, as it 
was caused by a zoonotic transmission that emerged in the inten-
sifying clash between humans and our environment. Further hu-
man-made disasters can therefore be expected, all of which must 
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be addressed through just processes and with more equitable out-
comes. This future makes it all the more important to learn the les-
sons from the experiences of Covid-19.
Our introductory chapter begins by tracing the path of coro-
navirus and its concomitant economic impacts, highlighting the 
liquidity blockages and fractures created in the flow of money 
that necessitated such a rapid and special response from public 
banks. Next, it draws on our contributors’ findings to highlight five 
promising lessons of how public banks responded to the Covid-19 
emergency. It then turns to the underlying question of ‘why pub-
lic banks’, exploring what is important and distinct about them. 
We conclude by considering the potential of public banks to ‘build 
forward better for people and the planet’ and how to deal with 
the coming backlash against rising public debt and a premature 
return to an obsession with austerity.
FROM HEALTH CRISIS TO A FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
When Covid-19 struck, for most governments the only response 
was either ‘gradual stop’ or ‘sudden stop’ through policies of social 
distancing and eventual lockdown. If economies can be thought of 
as supertankers – charting a course across oceans involving mil-
lions of moving parts and requiring time, distance and technical 
expertise to change course – it was as if these massive boats had 
hit an iceberg. Within days of turning off the engines, consumer 
demand and supply dried up simultaneously, even in countries that 
did not lock down their economies. This sparked record flows of 
capital in and out of equities and foreign exchange markets and in-
terrupted productive processes and employment everywhere (Aum 
et al. 2020; Anderson et al. 2020; Correia et al. 2020). No country was 
spared the economic effect of the contagion, even if they had no 
confirmed cases of the virus (such as in the Pacific islands).
Ideally, in such times, governments lead the way with respons-
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es that are rapid, bold, generous and crisis-facing. Political will 
is essential, as is the fiscal space or economic capacity to finance 
the blockages in the flow of finance, to fund increased health sec-
tor bills and unemployment benefits, and to underwrite the firms, 
households, public services, local authorities and even banks that 
are reeling as the flow of money is interrupted. What individual 
countries did varied according to their fiscal resources and the con-
texts of their unique political economies. Even as late into the crisis 
as October 2020, when this chapter was finalized, it is notable that 
the poorest countries of the world were struggling as they had less 
capacity to face Covid-19 than their wealthy counterparts. While 
rich countries could devote tens of billions of dollars (equalling as 
much as 50% of Gross Domestic Product – GDP) on their fiscal and 
monetary packages, many poor countries could spend amounts 
worth only a few per cent of GDP. By August 2020, Japan had spent 
as much as 52.6% of its GDP on a variety of fiscal and monetary 
packages; Germany had spent 38.5%, Canada 30% and the United 
States 27.5%, while even the large and higher income developing 
countries had spent only a fraction of this (UNCTAD 2020).
Some country differences in the financial scale and type of re-
sponse also reflect the extent to which societies would comply with 
the measures of social distancing and lockdown; but even in those 
countries where compliance was highest, additional finances still 
needed to be directed to the Covid-19 effort (for example, China 
spent almost 18% of GDP on a variety of fiscal and monetary policies 
alongside high levels of social compliance). While the international 
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank augmented their resources and scaled up their 
capacities to help, many have criticized their responses for being too 
little, too conditional and unevenly distributed (Kentikelenis 2020). 
These international financial institutions (IFIs) are not the fo-
cus of this volume, however. Instead, the book highlights the role of 
national and regional public banks, which are too often overlooked 
and under-studied despite their extremely significant roles in de-
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velopment, in supporting government policies, and in providing 
public financial capacity. Here we focus on how they functioned to 
‘keep the ship afloat’ amidst a global pandemic wave, and what les-
sons we need to draw from this as we think forward.
FIVE PROMISING LESSONS OF PUBLIC BANKS FACING COVID-19
The contributions to this book make one thing clear: Public banks 
have not stood idle in response to the economic and social dam-
age wrought by the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Rather, pub-
lic banks have emerged as dynamic financial institutions capable 
of responding to the needs of their societies. Five overarching and 
promising lessons stand out: public banks have the potential to 
respond rapidly; to fulfill their public purpose mandates; to act 
boldly; to mobilize their existing institutional capacity; and to 
build on ‘public-public’ solidarity. In short, public banks are help-
ing us navigate the tidal wave of Covid-19 at the same time as private 
lenders are turning away.
These promising lessons are drawn from the case studies in this 
volume, but this is not to say that every public bank responded in the 
same way or to the same extent. For some, it is more about the poten-
tial of positive actions than actual practice. Nonetheless, the lessons 
remain real, and are visible across a diverse public bank landscape. 
Rapid responses: In bank after bank, country after country, one 
thing stands out: public banks responded rapidly to the onset of the 
Covid-19 pandemic and to the sudden stop in economic activity. The 
significance of this must not be under-emphasized. Because public 
banks are within the public sphere, they can work with public au-
thorities at times of crisis and react quickly as a matter of policy. 
Public purpose mandates: Where the mandates of public banks 
reflect a clear public purpose, these banks were able to fulfill their 
mandates in responding to the Covid-19 crisis. The most promising 
cases are where their mandate is unambiguously supported by the 
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political authorities. Where political authority support was ambig-
uous, fractured or even hostile to public banks, the responses have 
been much less effective. 
Bold, generous and crisis-facing action: In many cases, public 
banks have responded to the challenge of Covid-19 with bold and 
generous actions that faced the crisis head-on. Central banks have 
pumped hundreds of billions of dollars into the economy to provide 
financial liquidity, relax financial regulations and support national 
financial responses. Public banks have crafted unprecedented re-
sponses to allow micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises (MS-
MEs), large businesses, public entities, governing authorities and 
households time to breathe, time to adjust and time to overcome 
the worst of the crisis. Typically, this meant offering liquidity with 
generously reduced rates of interest, preferential repayment terms 
and eased conditions of repayment. For the most vulnerable in so-
ciety, public banks offered non-repayable grants.
Existing institutional capacity and historical legacies: Public 
banks took advantage of having built-up expertise, capacity to co-
ordinate with others and existing lines of communication and de-
cision-making systems. In many cases, these capacities fit within a 
long historical legacy of the public bank working with and in soci-
ety in vital and credible ways. These historical legacies cannot be 
created suddenly at times of crisis. Where they already exist, it has 
tended to be advantageous to Covid-19 responses, placing govern-
ments in a stronger position. This is most evident in public banks 
with clear and accountable public mandates.
Public-public solidarity: Be they in the global north or south, 
public bank responses to the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated the 
advantages of non-competitive public-public solidarity among pub-
lic financial institutions (PFIs) – between public banks and other 
public entities and governing authorities. Public-public solidarity 
can be guided by political direction and it can occur as a result of al-
ready existing institutional linkages and collaborative public sphere 
legacies. While we see notable central bank and public bank coop-
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eration in most cases, there is evidence of public solidarity extend-
ing to the responses of sovereign wealth funds and public pension 
funds, as well as among national public banks and between public 
banks in different countries.
Finally, we have witnessed a broad range of tools and instru-
ments that public banks have used to carry out their roles, depend-
ing on their mandated function, their position within the overall 
financial system, the level of political support and the depth of their 
pockets. Table 1.1 provides a rough summary of what is possible in 
the face of Covid-19.
Table 1.1: Public bank functions and 




Liquidity •	Public banks, notably central and multilateral banks, have 
created new flows of finance to channel them into cash-
strapped households, economic sectors and governments
Lending •	 Increased lending to public and private clients, as well as to 
national and sub-national governments
•	Emergency lending programmes
•	Reduced and concessional interest rates
•	 Increased or unlimited credit ceilings
•	 Fast processing
•	Broader client base
•	Repayment holidays and deferrals
Grants •	Non-repayable financial resources provided to poorer 
countries, communities and public service providers
Loan 
guarantees
•	Governments backing public bank lending




•	Central banks and governments re-regulating financial rules 
to support increased lending and to support public and 
private banks’ balance sheets





•	Deferred payments on loans
•	Debt forgiveness
•	Grants
•	 International development programme support
Advisory 
services
•	 Information and advice to clients about the crisis
•	Assistance with the development of government policy
•	Provision of technical expertise for debt restructuring






•	Provision of income support and transfer payments
•	Emergency personal loans
•	Easing of eligibility criteria
•	Concessionary loans and grants
•	 Support and subsidies for essential services
Retail banking 
services
•	Enhanced online services and digitalization services
•	Reduced service fees
•	Mortgage and personal loan holidays and deferred payment 
options
•	Dissemination and application of public health and safety 
protocols







•	 Syndicated and solidarity public-public financing
•	Loan guarantees and on-lending support programmes
•	Bond purchases by public financial institutions
•	Mandated sharing of capital resources and deposits among 
public banks
•	Cross-subsidies to cover concessional services










•	Enacting support and financial aid programmes announced 
by governments
•	Provision of technical expertise
•	Offering emergency response coordination assistance 
nationally and internationally
Source: Compiled by authors.
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WHY BANKS?
The promising lessons and specific actions undertaken by public 
banks in response to the Covid-19 pandemic underscore the im-
portance of banks in general. This is because banks are themselves 
unique financial institutions that specialize in creating money, as 
well as managing it. Banks have acquired the political right to cre-
ate and circulate new money as credit within the economy and in 
society. This is an incredibly powerful function – by managing mon-
ey to make credit, banks can create money itself, and they can cre-
ate money through credits well in excess of the actual money held 
in their reserves (McLeay et al. 2014; Pettifor 2016). 
In other words, banks are financial intermediaries that can mag-
nify existing money resources (Spratt 2009). This is a function that 
governments cannot perform. Governments must acquire money 
resources before spending them. This can be done via taxation, re-
ceipts from public enterprises or from money raised in borrowing 
from others. But this is at a ratio of 1:1. The money governments 
raise (from taxes, enterprises and borrowing) equates to the money 
they spend. Banks, on the other hand, can magnify money resourc-
es three- to thirty-fold via ‘fractional reserve’ banking where institu-
tions need only hold onto a portion of the money lent out. 
WHY PUBLIC BANKS?
Because banks can magnify existing money resources, they have 
become one of the most important institutions in society. It is also 
one of the historical reasons why governments founded public 
banks and why public banks persist as credible financial institu-
tions. A public bank is a bank that can be understood as located in 
the ‘public sphere’. This can happen in different ways. A bank can 
be owned publicly – that is, by a government, public authority or 
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public enterprise; or it can be controlled publicly – that is, governed 
according to a legally binding public interest mandate, or according 
to public law, or by meaningful public representation on the gov-
erning board, or by some combination of these governance factors. 
Either or both situate a bank within the public sphere and as a pub-
lic financial institution (Schmit et al. 2011; OMFIF 2017). 
Can public banks function differently from private banks?
Being located within the public sphere opens up the potential for 
public banks to function differently from private banks. Private 
corporate banks are directly exposed to competitive market imper-
atives and to the short-term profit-maximizing horizons of share-
holders. Public banks need not follow these imperatives. The public 
sphere can shield public banks from ‘the market’. They are not nec-
essarily shielded – some public banks compete with private banks 
and governments mandate them to be profit-maximizing – but they 
can be as a matter of political will, and they can have a mandate that 
is complementary to, rather than competitive with, private banks. 
Consequently, public banks can offer loans, credits and grants in 
ways that are otherwise impossible for private, profit-seeking banks. 
In turn, public banks can and do operate according to a much wider 
variety of logics than private ones. Contributions to this book from 
the regional public bank associations are evidence of this, as are 
the ‘social’ mandates of the Council of Europe Development Bank 
(CEB) and the small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME)-focus of 
public banks in Argentina, China, Italy and others described in this 
volume. Yet other banks focus on supporting local governmental in-
stitutions as well as business.
How are public banks made accountable?
Public banks can also function differently because they can be 
democratically governed. That is, control over the bank need 
not be limited to shareholders alone but can extend to include 
societal representatives, as is done in the German development 
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bank, KfW. In turn, decision-making can be rendered transpar-
ent and accountable via publicly accessible debate and available 
documentation. There is no causal link, however. Just as public 
banks can be made democratic, so too can they be made less-
than representative, undemocratic or even authoritarian. In this 
respect, Covid-19 has also exposed less than ideal public bank-
ing and governing authority practices, notably in the cases of 
Turkey and India, where a long history of public banking has 
been turned in a different direction by government, as well as 
in Mexico. This strength or weakness of public bank governance 
ultimately depends on social forces in time- and place-bound 
historical contexts. What public banks do and how they evolve 
are the results of recurrent power struggles among and between 
contending public and private interests within capitalism (Ma-
rois and Güngen 2016). In fact, far from being meant to finance 
market development or being destined to fall victim to political 
corruption, public banks are much more ‘dynamic’ and indeter-
minant institutions whose functions are shaped and reshaped by 
class-divided social forces in the shadow of contemporary finan-
cialized capitalism (Marois forthcoming).
Aren’t public banks minor players?
Public banks continue to comprise a large and diverse part of the 
global financial sector to a degree that often surprises people. As of 
mid-2020, there were 910 public development, commercial/retail and 
universal banks worldwide with nearly US$49 trillion in combined as-
sets (McDonald et al. 2020). As we see in China, there are many mas-
sive ‘commercial’ public banks tasked with responding to Covid-19. 
Likewise, with Argentina’s Banco de la Nación. In Brazil, too, there is 
a widespread public banking sector that includes all types of public 
banks: commercial, universal and development. 
Recent research indicates that, if we include public central banks 
and multilateral banks, then institutional numbers reach 1,160 
and combined assets exceed US$66 trillion. Going one step further 
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to include public pension and investment funds, there are some 
1,651 public financial institutions commanding just under US$82 
trillion in public financial assets (Marois forthcoming). Other esti-
mates similarly show that public banks are much more significant 
in number and scale than previously recognized (Xu et al. 2019).
This underscores the enormous existing capacity of financial 
institutions within the public sphere. But it also exposes the pau-
city of existing research and debate. Some World Bank and Unit-
ed Nations documents have systematically underestimated global 
public banking capacity at somewhere between US$2 and $5 tril-
lion in assets (see de Luna-Martínez and Vicente 2012; UN IATF 
2019, 143). Other researchers prefer only to focus on public devel-
opment banks, with estimated institutional numbers in the range 
of 400 to 500 globally, with combined assets of just over US$11 tril-
lion (Xu et al. 2019; FiC 2020). 
It is worth emphasizing, too, that the Covid-19 crisis has led to 
a general increase in public banking activity and assets held. For 
some contributors to this book, this crisis moment is an opportuni-
ty to create new public banking institutions and local alternatives 
focused on supporting community development and more equita-
ble economic opportunities (both in the global north, particularly 
in the USA, and in the global south).
What’s the difference between types of public banks?
Public banks come in many different institutional types. In this book 
we mostly focus on development, commercial/retail and universal 
types of public banks, but we also include central banks and mul-
tilateral/regional banks. While they are all public financial institu-
tions, there are some distinguishing features and functions. Central 
banks are positioned at the zenith of national financial systems and 
are unique for issuing currency, holding national reserves, setting 
base interest rates, having regulatory and supervisory control over 
other domestic banks, and for acting as a lender of last resort to 
other banks. The chapter on central banks in this volume details the 
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extent to which Covid-19 has contributed to a sea-change in their 
actions, with operations, if not mandates, becoming much more di-
rectly supportive of government policy needs. 
Multilateral banks are owned by a group of countries to raise 
capital, lend capital, plan investments, provide expertise for mem-
bers, and, sometimes, play a lender-of-last resort role at times of 
crisis. In addition to the Council of Europe Development Bank, this 
volume also describes the different experiences and orientations 
of Covid-19 interventions of the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation.
Central and multilateral public banks often work closely with 
national and sub-national level development, commercial/retail 
and universal public banks. Development banks, also known as in-
vestment, promotional, policy, or as second tier banks, tend to fo-
cus on providing long-term, ‘patient’ finance for economic and so-
cial development purposes and will have considerable specialized 
knowledge on sectors like infrastructure, rural development, MS-
MEs, corporate finance, exports, public services and so on. These 
banks will often ‘on-lend’ to other commercial/retail and local de-
velopment banks as well as directly to governments, large industry 
and non-profit organizations. 
Commercial banks, also known as retail or first tier banks, 
accept short-term deposits from individuals, households, small 
businesses, corporations and public sector agencies for use as 
loanable capital. These banks provide retail financial services, 
from savings to insurance, chequing to investments, mortgages 
to car loans, and do so via sometimes quite local and sometimes 
quite extensive national and international branch networks. Oth-
er types of public banks that provide similar retail services in-
clude savings banks and postal banks. Finally, universal banks 
take what both development and commercial banks do and com-
bine them into a single institution to offer retail and develop-
ment/investment services.
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Where do public banks get capital to make loans?
Different sources of capital, as well as size, shape what public banks 
can do. Most public banks are usually ‘capitalized’ by governing au-
thorities, which provide the bank’s initial paid-in equity and ‘call-
able’ capital (the latter being a government’s promise to pay if and 
when the bank calls for additional capital). To grow and expand 
operations, public banks must access new and recurrent sources 
of capital. Some public commercial and universal banks do this by 
accepting savings and deposits from society at large (as in Turkey, 
Argentina, Brazil and China). Public development and multilateral 
banks will often raise new capital by issuing bonds in domestic and 
international bond markets (as in Germany and with the EIB, IADB 
and CEB). For all types of public banks, governments can direct-
ly inject new capital to boost lending capacity. Often, government 
contributions are made to support mandated lending to MSMEs, 
farmers, green transitions and so on. Financial regulations may 
require state, municipal and local authorities to make financial 
contributions or to deposit their receipts with public banks, both 
of which boost lending capacity (keeping in mind for every dollar 
deposited banks can lend multiples more). 
Like all banks, public banks borrow from other banks – public 
and private, domestically and internationally, including from the 
central bank – to meet their financial commitments. Other public 
financial institutions like sovereign wealth funds, insurance provid-
ers and pension funds will also channel money capital into pub-
lic banks, potentially constituting a form of public-public financial 
solidarity (Barrowclough and Gottschalk 2018). There is strong ev-
idence of public sphere collaboration in response to the Covid-19 
pandemic, with pension funds and central banks supporting devel-
opment banks, and development banks in turn supporting public 
commercial banks, health authorities, municipalities and so on 
(Marois forthcoming). 
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Are public banks naturally better at responding 
to crises like Covid-19?
Public banks are not naturally better or worse at responding to 
crises than private banks. However, because they exist within the 
public sphere, public banks do not need to function according to 
market-based and profit-maximizing imperatives. This opens up 
a world of possibilities. As a consequence, many public banks op-
erate very differently from private ones. As noted above, this has 
contributed to rapid and directed interventions at times of crisis, 
such as with Covid-19. The ability of banks to create credit means 
that money can be invested before it has been saved (McLeay et al. 
2014). Another way of looking at it is that banks, be they public or 
private, can make money available now to be repaid in the future, 
thus commanding “a power to make available time” (Konings 2018, 
79). But only through the public sphere can banks command time 
and money in the public interest in ways that can be transparent 
and accountable. The Eurodad contribution to this book reinforces 
this message and challenges us to rethink and reclaim public banks 
for a sustainable and socially equitable future beyond Covid-19.
BUILD FORWARD BETTER FOR PEOPLE AND PLANET
Public banks of all types are actively engaged in the question of how 
to build back better, even if the crisis of Covid-19 has meant many 
are concentrating on immediate recovery. Central banks have been 
behaving in ways that would have been unthinkable in recent de-
cades, harking back to their former role when they were an essential 
partner in support of national development goals. Even those that 
are evolving the least are nonetheless revising their financial mod-
els and regulatory approaches to include health and environmental 
stress-testing and risk disclosure. Sustainability criteria for public 
banking has passed from niche debate to increasingly mainstream 
action across the globe, in low-income countries just as much as in 
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wealthy ones (UNCTAD 2019; Barrowclough 2020). 
This is happening across the spectrum of financial institutions: 
just as central banks are showing renewed interest in their financial 
capacity to create and guide flows of money towards greener activ-
ities and away from fossil fuels, so too are other public banks and 
funds. National and sub-national public development, retail/com-
mercial and universal banks are, in many cases, already advanced 
towards greener and more just transitions. Over the last 10 to 15 
years, public banks have integrated green mandates and are acting 
to fund explicit decarbonization activities and environmental sus-
tainability (Marois forthcoming). The United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) have provided a global narrative and 
orientation for these lending activities and many public banks are 
actively reappraising their mandates and work programmes to bet-
ter align with them (for example, the Islamic Development Bank 
insists the SDGs should guide both their lending programmes and 
technical assistance to member countries). 
There is a risk, however, that the more market-oriented and neo-
liberal orientations of the IFIs and some multilateral development 
banks (notably the World Bank) could undermine the policy space 
and credibility of national and sub-national public banks to effect 
pro-public and socially-equitable alternative transformation. Also, 
as public institutions have necessarily taken on increased debt to 
combat Covid-19, there is the threat of an austerity backlash, with 
critics dusting off their timeless criticisms of what they argue to 
be the inherent inefficiencies of public banks (La Porta et al. 2002; 
Barth et al. 2006; Cull et al 2017). They will likely raise the spectre of 
the politicization of public banks, arguing that public banks follow 
political mandates (ignoring that this constitutes a foundation of ef-
fectiveness in cases like Germany’s KfW). All this will be resurrect-
ed not to suggest ways to make public banking better, or for them 
to more effectively catalyze a green and just transition, but rather 
as a bludgeon to force through bank privatizations that will further 
concentrate financial capacity in the private sector.
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To argue that public banks should lead efforts to build forward 
better for people and the planet is not, however, to naively sug-
gest that a bank is necessarily better by virtue of being publicly 
owned. There is no innate purpose or essential policy orientation 
that is common to all public banks. This is because public banks 
are contested and pulled between contending public and private 
interests. They are also just one element within the landscape of 
all financial institutions, which is nested within a global environ-
ment that is created by national and international economic and 
political forces. 
To ensure a pro-public orientation of public banks, many things 
and social forces need to be aligned – or at the least not actively 
misaligned (Eurodad 2017). If public banks are to make a significant 
contribution to the post-Covid world, they can be most effective 
when they are part of a pro-public and socially just development 
articulation, with democratic central banks at the apex, supported 
by a diverse mixture of financial institutions with differentiated and 
distinctive roles. This in turn needs to be positively integrated with 
broader government policies and national development goals that 
are subject to substantive democratic structures. 
To support public banks in the wake of Covid-19, three broad 
organizing strategies are needed within banks themselves and in 
the wider political economic landscape in which they exist. They 
include definancialization, decarbonization and democratization 
(Marois forthcoming; UNCTAD 2019,143-177). We outline each of 
these in turn.
First, public banks offer a potential path towards definancializa-
tion; that is, a path away from the short-term, speculative and of-
ten predatory practices of the hyper-financialized hyper-globalized 
world that emerged from the 1980s, as financial markets were lib-
eralized and cross-border capital flows were completely unregulat-
ed. The global financial crisis revealed the waste and damage that 
excessively financialized markets can generate, and many countries 
established new public banks and funds or strengthened existing 
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ones in recognition that private banking had failed to do enough 
for development. 
Ideally, the entire financial system would be re-regulated so 
as to be less highly concentrated, more competitive and less vul-
nerable to banks that are ‘too big to fail’, but even without this 
public banks can be a bastion for change. They can be shielded 
by the public sphere so they need not operate only in narrowly 
financial terms and can do more to provide catalytic and ‘patient 
finance’ that provides long-term public benefits in the public in-
terest (UNCTAD 2019; Macfarlane and Mazzucato2018). Instead 
of short-term profit-maximization, solidarity-driven public banks 
can help each other to coordinate lending to reduce the cost of 
borrowing and generate cost savings for governing authorities 
(ALIDE 2018). Through the use of a fractional reserve system, 
public banks can also offer a powerful fiscal advantage to state 
authorities (von Mettenheim 2010). This can help to reduce de-
pendencies on foreign, private, market-based finance and the 
monopoly control of private bankers over public policy (Scherrer 
2017; Marshall and Rochon 2019). 
Second, public banks offer a potential path towards decarbon-
ization, the urgency of which has not diminished with the Covid-19 
crisis. Widespread agreement around the failure of private banks to 
respond to the financing needs for mitigating global warming has 
made room for the potentially catalytic role of public banks to re-
spond in new and innovative ways (Campiglio et al. 2017; Carney 
2015; Scott et al. 2017; UNCTAD 2019). There is now a very long list 
of central banks, public banks and public financial institutions that 
have taken on board the need to restructure and reorient them-
selves in line with the decarbonization challenge (Dikau and Volz 
2020; Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2017; FiC 2020; Marois forthcom-
ing; UNCTAD 2019). Empirical evidence suggests that public inves-
tors are the main reason that renewable energy finance grew at all 
in the years following the global financial crisis (Mazzucato and 
Semieniuk, 2018).
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Finally, public banks offer a potential path towards democrati-
zation; that is, for society to have a meaningful say over how finan-
cial resources are deployed (Epstein 2010; Block 2014). Democrati-
zation of bank governance and decision-making is a process that 
can, among other things, drive innovation alongside social inclu-
sion and equity through internalizing the public interest and mo-
bilizing towards identified societal priorities. The democratization 
of finance is a central and recurrent demand made by academics 
and community groups critical of financialized capitalism. At the 
same time, public banks cannot exist as an island of democratic 
governance within a broader sea that follows other, non-democrat-
ic principles and this is a challenge that needs to be addressed going 
forward if public banks are to be able to contribute effectively in the 
Covid-19 building forward better phase.
FUTURE RESEARCH
This book is the first study of public bank responses to Covid-19 and 
raises as many questions as it answers, highlighting the need for 
further case study and empirical work. How effective have their pol-
icies been? Who benefitted and why? What can make their policies 
and actions more equitable and democratic? 
Research will need to systematically identify where the mon-
ey came from that enabled public banks to respond rapidly and at 
scale. Capital markets played a role, but it is not evident that they 
played a dominant role. Where else did monetary resources come 
from? What role did different private and public sources play? Im-
portantly, did these different sources of finance differentially affect 
how public banks could respond to the Covid-19 crisis? 
It is also not clear that Covid-19 financial responses have been 
able to underwrite a ‘green’ recovery. If not, why not? Moreover, 
what can be done to ensure future responses to crises deliver sus-
tainable and just recoveries? Related to this, public services have 
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been on the Covid-19 pandemic frontlines, notably in the health, 
water, sanitation, transportation and education sectors. Have pub-
lic bank emergency responses provided effective and appropriate 
support for these essential public services? 
The Covid-19 crisis has also shone a light on otherwise hid-
den public bank coordination networks and collaborative prac-
tices. These public-public networks need to be better understood 
and expanded, with knowledge sharing and capacity support 
building being critical to a more sustainable global public bank-
ing network. 
One of the biggest black holes in our understanding of public 
banks is around representative governance structures. There is an 
urgent need to examine and rethink public banks’ accountabili-
ty and transparency practices. As global ambitions mount over 
the future role of public banks funding green transitions, so too 
must our demands to democratize the processes of financing such 
structural change. At the same time, we need to come to grips with 
the coming economic and political implications of ramped up 
public bank Covid-19 lending. There is no avoiding future losses 
and a heavy strain of the balance sheets of public banks. This will 
have political ramifications. How can we prepare public banks for 
this as well as their government shareholders and affected com-
munities, both in terms of dealing with the economic losses and 
the political fallout?
Finally, there is an opportunity to rethink public banks as 
dynamic and contested institutions. This means finding alter-
native means of pro-public assessment. It is unacceptable that 
private sector performance indicators (such as profitability as a 
proxy for efficiency) are grafted onto public banks that function 
according to very different operational mandates (for a parallel 
argument in the water sector see McDonald (2016)). Determin-
ing and implementing appropriate alternative criteria may well 
prove the difference between public banks functioning in the 
public or private interest.
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LAYOUT OF THE BOOK
When we initially reached out to potential contributors in April 
2020, shortly after the declaration of a global pandemic, it was not 
clear who would be able to participate and what kind of information 
they would be able to collect. We provided authors with a standard-
ized list of questions to investigate in their locale – including back-
ground information on the bank, a summary of the pandemic out-
break in the study location, key actions taken by the bank to respond 
to Covid-19 and their intended beneficiaries, the effectiveness of these 
bank actions, collaboration with other public service providers and 
public banks, and the impact of Covid-19 on longer-term operations. 
However, the constantly shifting nature of the crisis, combined with 
very different personal and geographical contexts of the researchers, 
made consistency across the chapters difficult. 
But it is perhaps the eclectic nature of this book that is its great-
est strength, illustrating both a universality of public bank expe-
riences as well as their diverse realities. Collectively, they offer a 
set of insights that must be fully sampled to appreciate the overall 
flavour. In this respect we encourage readers to review a broad se-
lection of chapters, from different locations and different perspec-
tives. We have therefore intentionally placed the case studies in this 
book in random order to promote geographical and institutional ex-
ploration (with the exception of the chapters written by the public 
bank and development finance institution associations, which are 
clustered together).
Lastly, we want to remind readers that this is a ‘rapid response’ 
project, which means that the authors and the editors were working 
under very tight timelines to release the findings, as were the copy-
editors and designers. We therefore ask our more diligent readers 
to forgive us any minor formatting, citation or typographical errors. 
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